



Traceability in Food Systems: 
An Economic Analysis of LGMA and the 2006 Spinach Outbreak 
 
William Nganje, Paul F. Skilton, Helen Jensen, and Raphael Onyeaghala* 
 
Contact Author:  William Nganje, Associate Professor 
MSARM – W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University 
Email: William.nganje@asu.edu, Phone: 480/727-1524 
   
Abstract 
This case study presents an in-depth review of network structures and costs associated with the 
implementation of traceability systems in California leafy green production, distribution, and 
retailing.  The 2006 spinach outbreak is used to assess the economic impact of trace 
back/forward response time of the LGMA system, an example of a tightly coupled, linear supply 
network. Results suggest that the benefits of traceability systems may far outweigh the costs and 
that costs vary significantly by technology used and by grower size.  Implications are derived for 
cost-effectiveness of rapid response, targeted trace back/forward systems in other types of supply 
networks.  
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Traceability in Food Systems: 




In the current climate of heightened awareness of foodborne illnesses from pathogens and 
chemical contamination, a major concern involves the actions taken by the industry and federal 
agencies to contain or trace the source of current and future outbreaks in a timely, targeted, and 
cost-effective manner.  However, trace back and containment of catastrophic food events often 
take several weeks or months, resulting in greater economic loss to the industry, regional, and 
national economies. The duration and cost of trace back for food imports may be even more 
problematic. For example, the 2006 California spinach E. coli outbreak source was identified on 
September 20, 47 days after the first reported case on August 5 (See Appendix 1) while the 2008 
Salmonella enterica outbreak of fresh jalapeño and Serrano peppers from Mexico took 81 days. 
To address these concerns the U.S. Food and Drug Administration is proposing a mandatory 
electronic traceability format for each point along the supply chain within 24 hours of an FDA 
request. The proposed rule suggests that, although implementing electronic traceability systems 
would come at an added cost to the industry, several benefits outweigh the cost.   
There is little question that rapid response and targeted trace back systems can minimize 
economic damage inflicted by food safety events by speeding up and narrowing product recalls. 
Faster recalls avoid additional cases of illness or death, and targeted recalls avoid false alarms on 
products that are safe. Despite this awareness and the proliferation of traceability standards and 
systems, investigators in food supply networks often find that when faced with an unexpected 
failure, participants ‘scramble’ to produce the required information, leading to information losses 
or errors (Charlier & Valceschini, 2007) that turn into delays. One reason for these problems is 3 
 
that traceability systems are not uniformly implemented by all participants. As long as 
implementation is voluntary, some participants may try to avoid or reduce the costs of 
implementing traceability systems. This suggests that enforcing centralized or cooperative 
standards for rapid response among participants in food supply networks is a critical step in 
reducing trace back times and executing more targeted recalls.  
We investigate the costs and benefits of implementing the 24 hours traceability rule by 
examining the development of the California Leafy Green Marketing Agreement (LGMA). The 
LGMA was officially formed in September of 2007 in response to the 2006 E. coli O157:H7 
outbreak associated with bagged baby spinach produced on farms located in the Salinas Valley 
of central costal California (Stuart, Shennan and Brown, 2006). Presently, the LGMA consists of 
120 growers, distributors and processors that account for approximately 99% of the volume of 
leafy greens (14 types of leafy greens) produced in California (See Appendix 2).  Our case study 
provides an in-depth review of the costs and benefits associated with the implementation of 
traceability systems in California leafy green production, distribution, and retailing; an example 
of a tightly coupled, linear supply network. Costs are estimated for two electronic traceability 
systems (electronic barcode and RFID).  The profit model developed by Pouliot and Sumner 
(2008) and data from the 2006 spinach outbreak is used to assess the cost-effectiveness of trace 
back response rate of the LGMA system. 
 
Traceability and Supply Network Structure  
Complex network structure is one potential reason why firms tend to delay investments in 
rapid response trace back systems. Although traceability in the food supply network is often 
regarded as a product level phenomenon, it is at least partially a function of the characteristics of 4 
 
the supply network structure (Roth, Tsay, Pullman and Gray, 2008). In the LGMA we develop 
the idea that traceability depends on characteristics of food supply networks that enable users to 
accurately reconstruct the chronology and flow of the steps in the production, distribution and 
retail of the network’s products.  
The California leafy greens supply network is an ideal setting for a study of this type, 
because it structure is likely to facilitate implementation of traceability systems. Skilton and 
Robinson (2009), adapting Perrow’s theory of normal accidents (1999) to supply networks, 
proposed the leafy greens network as an example of a tightly coupled, linear supply system.  
Perrow (1999) defined systems network complexity between 1) complex systems and linear 
ones, and 2) tightly coupled and loosely coupled systems (Figure 1). He argued that system 
complexity is important because complex interactions multiply the opportunities for hard to 
understand accidents to occur.  Complex systems have unplanned, unexpected, invisible, 
unfamiliar, ambiguous or incomprehensible sequences, often made more obscure by poorly 
understood transformation processes. Less complex systems are likely to be more transparent 
because interactions will be less complex, transformations will be fewer and the number and 
variety of components or actors involved will be less. As a result, linear systems afford a greater 
opportunity to get a clear picture of the whole system, making them easier to trace back.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
On the other dimension loosely coupled systems allow for processing delays, do not have 
fixed sequences or relationships, retain slack resources and exploit fortuitous substitution 
possibilities (Skilton and Robinson, 2009). In tightly coupled systems performance standards are 
enforced and unambiguous (e.g. marketing contract).  Delays are minimized, sequences are 
invariant, methods are constrained, any buffers or redundancies are designed, and substitutions 5 
 
or commingling are limited.  Loosely coupled systems are less likely to be transparent because 
sensitive information is more likely to be ambiguous and less likely to be visible to and 
understood by the various actors in the system. Tightly coupled systems thus facilitate trace back 
by ensuring that information is captured, maintained and readily available for rapid recall.  
We argue that compared to other supply networks, the California leafy greens industry 
exhibited the characteristics of a linear, tightly coupled supply network.  In the typical leafy 
greens network, as shown in Figure 2, multiple growers supply a packer, who ships product 
either to a distribution center or to a re-packer. If product is re-packed, it is shipped to a 
distribution center. Distribution centers, which can be controlled by third parties or by retailers, 
ship to retailers. The network is linearly structured, as can be seen by the limited number of 
transitive triadic relationships in the figure. A triadic relationship is transitive if A is connected to 
B, B is connected to C, and C is connected to A. In this case the only triadic relationships are 
between the packer, re-packer and distributors, and between the packer, distribution center and 
retailer distribution center.  The entities depicted in the figure (such as growers’ fields, packing 
facilities, distributors and retailers) are arranged in chains that are only sparsely linked to each 
other. Within these chains relationships are governed by rigorously enforced contracts that 
specify detailed information flows. In a network of this type the number of paths through the 
network is relatively small. Because information flows and material flows are tightly linked, data 
are more likely to retain their integrity.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Changing either coupling or complexity alters traceability. A loosely coupled, linear 
supply network would also consist of mostly intransitive triads, without the constraint of highly 
specified relationships. In a network of this type the number of paths through the network is 6 
 
relatively small, but, in the absence of tight coupling, information and material flows are less 
likely to retain their integrity. Examples of this type of network can be found in the supply of 
traditional and locally produced foods. There are typically only a few types of actor in these 
systems, which interact without contracts and without close supervision by regulators. Growers, 
processors and consumers are local and small. While coupling is loose, it should be noted that 
the simplicity of the network can make trace back easy.  
Trace back is more difficult when supply networks are complex. A tightly coupled 
complex supply network would be made up of many types of actor, arranged in networks in 
which connections are relatively dense and connected by relationships that are governed by 
rigorously enforced contracts specifying detailed information flows. Skilton and Robinson 
(2009) suggest that networks of this type may be rare because of the competing pressures of 
network complexity and tight coupling. Complexity tends to make data integrity difficult to 
achieve, particularly when transformations and commingling are common. Trying to manage this 
by imposing tight coupling is likely to result in reductions in complexity. 
This suggests that loosely coupled complex supply networks will be more common than 
tightly coupled complex ones. Many food supply networks have this form, which is the type in 
which traceability is most difficult. An example of this type of network is a broker based 
network supplying commodity inputs, particularly those that have been transformed, such as 
ground beef. While it is in these complex supply networks that trace back is most difficult (Moss, 
2009), the fact that traceability is also a problem in tightly coupled linear ones leads us to try to 
understand the simpler case, represented by the LGMA, first. We make this attempt in the hope 
of arriving at a better understanding of the costs and benefits of system wide implementation that 
will be at least in part transferable to more complex cases. 7 
 
 
Traceability systems within the LGMA  
The LGMA, as described in Appendix 1, is extremely simple. It does not require 
members to implement specific systems. Although it encourages the use of tracking systems 
based on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), no specific technology or information system 
is mandated by the agreement itself. Instead the agreement makes reference to federal law the 
only explicit specification for compliance with the agreement. The LGMA audit checklists’ 
specific requirements are given as follows (LGMA, 2008):  
1)  GR 03 – Is an up to date growers list with contact and location information available for 
review? 
2)  GR 04 – Is the handler in compliance with the registration requirement of The Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002? 
3)  GR 05 – Does the Handler have a traceability process? 
a.  GR 05a – Does it enable identification of immediate non-transporter source? 
b.  GR 05b – Does it enable identification of immediate non-transporter subsequent 
recipient? 
While the implementation of a specific electronic traceability system is not required in 
the LGMA requirements, the majority of members have deployed barcode or RFID technologies 
to meet the requirements of the marketing agreement (Estrada-Flores, 2009). Barcodes are still 
the predominant technology used by leafy green growers, distributors and retailers, but because 
they require line of sight, barcode data is often captured using handheld devices. Handheld 
devices increase the probability of human error and require batch uploading, increasing the 
difficulty of ensuring data integrity. Cost limitations have been cited as a major reason why other 8 
 
real time technologies are not extensively used. RFID can enhance rapid response by improving 
and automating capture of logistics data, permitting near real-time tracking, which in turn 
enables logistic managers to proactively respond to events in the supply chain, such as breaches 
of the cold chain. 
Regardless of the specific technology deployed, identifying tags are placed on boxes, 
pallets, and/or the product packaging, in which the assigned unique number provides the 
information necessary to trace the product back to the immediately preceding stage of 
production. Tag data frequently records, but is not limited to, grower, ranch location, planting 
block/lot, planting date, harvesting date, harvesting crew, ship date, ship-to locations, 
manufacturing plant, production shift and line, production date, and a “Best if Used By” date 
(Church Brothers Produce, 2009; Estrada-Flores, 2009; Sunridge Farms, 2009).   
As depicted by the audit requirements of the LGMA and by the description of a number 
of LGMA members’ traceability systems, the success of a traceability system relies heavily on 
comprehensive documentation and record-keeping procedures. For example, Growers Express’ 
field managers maintain records regarding staff and all products and materials used during the 
production process. These records are primarily electronically stored. Growers Express maintains 
that pertinent trace back data can be made available for review by investigators within two hours 
of notice (Growers Express 2009).  The tightly coupled linear network of LGMA participants 
involves as many as five stages that link the retailer to the farm (see Figure 1). These linkages 
represent both information flows and the physical distribution and storage of food shipments 
(Estrada-Flores, 2009).  
A survey conducted by Tootelian (2007) revealed that prior to the 2006 E. coli outbreak, 
89.8% of all growers indicated they had traceability in place.  It should be noted that 100% of 9 
 
growers shipping more than 1,000,000 lb had traceability systems. However, the predominant 
traceability systems were paper trail and barcode technology, making it challenging to conclude 
that these systems were able to trace back within 24 hours for each participant involved.  The 
survey indicated that after the 2006 outbreak 60.5% of growers indicated they had expanded 
their traceability programs to more electronic form systems, including real time tracking.  The 
following two examples provide insight on trace back rate for current electronic users. In August 
2007, Metz Fresh, LLC employed their traceability system after finding that 8,000 cartons of 
fresh spinach tested positive for Salmonella. Within three days of harvest, stores and restaurants 
were notified of the product recall, whereby more than 90 percent of the tainted spinach never 
reached the market (CIDRAP, 2007). In the summer of 2009, Tanimura & Antle Inc. recalled 
romaine lettuce after random testing conducted by Wisconsin Department of Agriculture found 
traces of Salmonella. Tanimura & Antle was informed of the possible contamination on July 20, 
which was the same day that the product was distributed to 29 states, Canada and Puerto Rico 
(Withers, 2009). Tanimura & Antle was able to identify that the potentially contaminated lot 
(code 531380) was harvested between June 25 and July 2 and alerted their customers of the 
recalled product within hours of being notified (FDA, 2009).   
Because the kinds of technology deployed can alter the ability to achieve 24 hour trace 
back, in the next section we provide traceability cost estimates for two trace back technologies 
currently or potentially used by Leafy Green members; barcodes (which are the most commonly 
deployed base technology) and RFID (which we use to provide an upper cost range).   10 
 
 
Cost of the LGMA Traceability System 
Adhering to the LGMA standards and meeting the audit compliance requirements can be 
costly for members.  Paggi (2008) noted that LGMA compliance costs range between $210 and 
$260 per acre. Of this cost, approximately $50 per acre is estimated to be record keeping costs. 
Annual investment in food safety for LGMA members have almost tripled since the introduction 
of LGMA. According to the 2007 LGMA status report, total LGMA annual food safety 
investments prior to September 2006 was $23.7 million, compared to $71.3 million after 
September 2006 (Tootelian, 2008). This translates to an average annual investment of $604,545 
per member enterprise after September 2006. Combining the estimated annual operating costs 
for LGMA audit compliance (food safety employee costs, annual water testing expenses, annual 
LGMA membership funding), and the total estimated annual investment for LGMA compliance, 
the estimated total costs for LGMA members’ compliance range from approximately $80 -$91 
million per year (Table 1). These costs would cover expenses incurred by growers and handlers, 
and the traceability systems in this tightly coupled, linear network system could represent costs 
for tracing production forward from production to distributor. This estimate implies that average 
annual expenses relating to compliance to the LGMA range from $0.0128 to $0.0158 per pound 
(Table 1).  
Insert Table 1 Here 
We estimate that a significant percent of the food safety cost (20 to 45 percent of the total 
LGMA compliance cost) is attributed to record keeping and traceability.  However, the actual 
cost share varies widely for individual enterprises based on the type of traceability systems used 
(paper records, barcodes and RFID). 11 
 
 
 Traceability cost with alternative food system network technologies  
Table 2 shows a summary breakdown of traceability costs by technology used and by 
grower size. Costs for two technologies (barcode and RFID) were estimated for representative 
firms by size, and then aggregated to obtain the estimated industry costs. Each system’s costs 
include both variable and fixed costs were computed for representative firms of three sizes 
measured in shipment volume (1= 0 - 100,000 pounds; 2 = 100,001 – 999,999 pounds; 3 = 1 
million or more pounds) and are shown in Table 2. Among the actual LGMA membership 
(n=118), 34.3% were in size category 1; 36.3% in size category 2; and 29.4% in category 3 
(Tootelian, 2008). The related costs for firms in each of the three size categories were aggregated 
by their share of the industry members to get the total industry costs.  Industry costs and 
parameters were based on Tootelian’s report (2008), state/industry statistics, and other published 
documents. The cost estimates were estimated from the volume of leafy greens of the California 
leafy greens industry, which represents approximately 75% of the total U.S. volume (LGMA, 
2008). 
Insert Table 2 Here 
For each of the technologies, total fixed cost is the sum of the individual fixed cost 
components. The fixed costs were depreciated over 5 years and using a discount rate of 10% as 
the discount value for the cost of working capital.  Variable costs differ by the size of the 
member groups. Total variable costs include the sum of the variable costs based on their 
assignment to the traceability system. As example, a barcode based system has variable costs for 
the three size groups of $1,868,819 (sum of $91,405, $192,281 and $1,585,133). These costs are 
simulated from the volume of shipments for all members in that size category. The variable costs 12 
 
include costs for barcode labels, barcode label printer, barcode handheld reader and employee 
training. The total fixed cost for the barcode system is $1,393,258. Total cost is the sum of fixed 
and variable costs. For the barcode system, the total cost is $3,262,077, and apply if all firms 
adopted the barcode system.  
The total industry costs were estimated for each of the two technologies (RFID and bar 
code) by aggregating the costs incurred by the firms in the industry across the three sizes of 
firms. For both technologies, total fixed and variable costs were highest for the RFID system 
($109 million for Passive Tags and $1,372 million for Active Tags). As shown in Table 2, costs 
also vary by firm size or sales volume (firm size categories assigned to member type 1, 2 or 3).  
For example, the RFID variable cost range for small and large sales volume varied between 
$132,905 and $87.5 million for Passive Tags. The variable costs for the barcode system ranged 
from nearly $91,000 to $1.6 million for the small and large sales volume, respectively (Table 2).   
In estimating cost and technology configurations for traceability systems, it should be 
noted that when commingling is prevalent (for loosely coupled, linear and complex systems), 
then multiple barcodes would be needed. Bar code technology was determined to be the least 
expensive in a tightly coupled, linear system, such as spinach. However, the usage of active 
RFID tags and technologies that enable data to be rewritten at multiple locations could become 
cost-effective when a requirement for multiple barcodes exists. Hence, requiring and enforcing 
information one step back and one forward has implications in this example for both cost and 
technology selected depending on the firm’s size and processes done by each enterprise. 13 
 
 
Simulated Benefits of LGMA Traceability System & the E. coli O157:H7 Outbreak 
The severity of the widely-publicized 2006 E. coli O157:H7 outbreak continues to be 
startling, in which 204 persons were infected, including 31 cases of hemolytic-uremic syndrome 
(a serious complication that can cause kidney failure) and three deaths (Table 3).  Moreover, in 
the decade preceding the 2006 epidemic, nine other E. coli O157:H7 outbreaks were linked to 
lettuce or spinach grown in the Salinas Valley region of California (Cooley et al.). The personal 
injury and lives lost continue to be the utmost regrettable consequence from this outbreak, yet the 
economic and financial fallout have also severely impacted the public. The entire U.S. spinach 
industry experienced financial losses and reputation damage, while consumers’ confidence in 
food safety diminished and public funding was allotted to recoup the costs of the outbreak.  
The estimated benefits of having a traceability system in place result from avoiding 
losses to the firm, public and industry, which are associated with an outbreak, such as the 2006 
E. coli O157:H7 incident.  We estimate the failure costs associated with the 2006 E. coli 
O157:H7 outbreak based on the U.S. spinach industry losses and the total costs associated with 
the product recall to be approximately $129 million USD (Table 3). The industry cost of the 
outbreak was estimated at $80 million USD but some studies have reported industry loses in the 
range of $100 million to over $350 million (McKinley, 2006; Weise and Schmit, 2007).  
Insert Table 3 Here 
The total volume of contaminated product that caused the outbreak and the product 
recalls was approximately 15,750 pounds of bagged Dole Baby Spinach, which are identified by 
the code P227A. The code indicates that the spinach was produced at Natural Selection’s south 
plant (P) on the 227
th day of the year (August 15) during the first of two shifts (A) (Weise and 14 
 
Schmit, 2007). Although several leafy green products were recalled due to the outbreak, the 
15,750 pounds of bagged Dole Baby Spinach was deemed responsible for the outbreak and 
product recalls. Losses due to false alarm for commingled products or spinach produce out of 
California could have been avoided if trace back were rapid (occurred within 24 hours for each 
segment in Figure 1) and technology could lead to more targeted recall.   
In order to simulate the traceability benefits and cost-effectiveness of the LGMA systems 
we assume that trace forward response rates could improve significantly from 47 days to less 
than 50% (24 days) and 75% (12 days) with rapid response, targeted systems like RFID and GS1 
systems (Appendix 2).  This assumption is realistic as the survey by Tootelian (2007) revealed 
that about 60.5% of those who had paper trail or barcode traceability systems expanded their 
systems.  This expansion should include better electronic tracking systems. The assumptions of 
increased use of electronic systems and availability of linking the electronic information across 
agents in the food system are consistent with the program recommended by the panel for 24-hour 
electronic data availability (IFT, 2009).  
We simulated cost-effectiveness using the profit model developed by Pouliot and Sumner 
(2008) and the assumptions on trace forward response rates above.  Their model include three 
main components for net profits; gross revenue less cost of providing traceable and safe produce, 
less expected loss associated with unsafe food delivery (Table 3). Simulated benefits suggest that 
rapid response targeted systems could have mitigate between $9,795,564 and $93,562,205 USD.   
Although the range of improved benefits is large, the study indicates the significant 
improvement possible through having access to supplies and product destination information 
through electronic means. The estimated costs and simulation employed in the case of the 
LGMA for spinach indicates that there are significant savings from more rapid response. This 15 
 
response results from information technologies that improve the ability to track product flow. 
Compliance costs of LGMA membership (of $0.0128 - $0.0158 per pound, with the associated 
record keeping and traceability costs ranging from $0.0026 to $0.0071 per pound) are 
significantly lower than the potential benefits of avoiding the 2006 E. coli O157:H7 outbreak and 
product recall. The costs are lower than the benefits achieved when more rapid and targeted 
recall systems (24 hour system for each participant) reduce the trace forward response time by 50 
percent (24 days) or 75 percent (12 days) in this case. Some of these costs are expected to be 
passed forward to consumers. For firms, costs of having a system in place would be recurring 
costs to the industry. Any individual firm may not experience a recall within a year. It is likely to 
be a relatively rare event. However, for the industry, having a rapid response system in place 
reduces the costs (provides benefit) across the industry when a recall does occur. 
Again, these are conservative benefit estimates but appropriate since not all LGMA 
members currently have 24 hours rapid response trace back systems in place. It is true that the 
benefits could be even larger if recall are made before products even enter the retail outlet or sold 
to end consumers.  These results reveal that with advancement in policy and adoption of rapid 
response trace back technology adoption industry benefits may by far outweigh the costs. Net 
present value and dynamic analysis suggest even more savings as cost of technology will 
continue to decline.    
 
Conclusion and Food Policy Implications 
The important policy debate in the U.S. and other countries is whether or not to mandate 
traceability for domestic and international food supply chain. In the U.S. for example, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) is considering a 24 hour rapid response trace forward and 16 
 
backward electronic system.  The emphasis of such a program in prior studies has mostly been 
on the cost of implementation. We expand the discussion to show that in the case of California 
LGMA there are clear benefits to implementing rapid response and targeted traceability systems 
in food supply networks. If recalls are not conducted in a timely and targeted manner, even 
participants whose product is not contaminated suffer economic losses. 
Following Skilton and Robinson (2009) we proposed that traceability is partly a function 
of the characteristics of the food supply network, and system complexity could not be 
overlooked. The LGMA supply network structure is tightly coupled and linear, which we have 
argued is the most desirable structure for achieving traceability. Estimating the cost of 
traceability of such a system is less complicated and direct. The problem that is revealed by 
introducing network structure as a predictor of mandating traceability is that many food supply 
networks are either loosely coupled or complex. Both of these structural characteristics impede 
traceability. One of the most important implications of this theory is that traceability systems 
must be tailored to the supply networks they are deployed in. Tightly coupled linear networks 
present the fewest challenges to systems developers, so it is no surprise that effective traceability 
systems are already common in these networks. Formal systems are much less common in 
loosely coupled linear networks, in part because there are very few steps between the raw 
material and the final consumer. Because of this the costs to small players of implementing 
formal systems are high relative to the benefits in terms of traceability.  
As networks become more complex, traceability systems must follow suit. In complex 
networks the challenge is how the traceability system would preserve information through 
transformative processes, co-mingling of shipments and other information degrading processes 
that characterize complex networks. Effective trace back/forward in complex tightly coupled 17 
 
systems may depend on the presence of large, powerful players such as global food companies or 
global retailers in the network. These participants have an interest in rapid trace back because 
they have investments in brand that are put at risk by adverse events. Strong central participants 
would have to create a climate of enforcement throughout the network. Wal-Mart has begun to 
take this approach as evidenced by the retailer’s recently announced sustainability initiative 
(Rosenbloom, 2008). This initiative will result in a network with fewer suppliers operating in 
more tightly coupled relationships. A key issue for firms seeking to influence network practices 
will be their ‘reach’ or how far their influence extends into the network of suppliers. Since 
controlling a complex network requires information intensive relationships with a greater variety 
of counterparties, there is a risk of information overload for the controlling firm. In tightly 
coupled networks, reducing complexity and assigning an enforcement role to a central player 
would make traceability systems possible, but only at a high cost in terms of system resources, 
data quality and the opportunity costs of committing to a smaller supplier base for any product.  
In a loosely coupled complex network, we think solutions are limited to very simple 
logistics approaches similar to the one deployed by the LGMA. The problem in these networks is 
the absence of a central player, which suggests that government intervention, perhaps on an 
international scale, will be necessary. It is also possible that solutions will emerge from 
technology suppliers. There is a global consortium designing a standard protocol for logistics 
traceability based on RFID tags (IBM, 2007), but systems cost continues to be limiting.  
Electronic barcode are a fraction of RFID costs, but do not have the same capabilities for 
enabling rapid response.  However, advances in technologies will continue to drive cost of RFID 
and other rapid response targeted technologies lower and more affordable over time.   18 
 
Rapid response, targeted technologies have significant long-run benefit potentials.  
Potential savings from a single outbreak like the 2006 E. coli O157:H7 outbreak indicates 
benefits of minimizing recall loss may by far outweigh the cost of compliance of the LGMA 
traceability investments (except in the implementation of Active RFID Tags for large growers in 
this case).  Noticeably, the compliance costs of LGMA membership ($0.0128 -$0.0158 per 
pound, with the associated record keeping and traceability costs ranging from $0.0026 to 
$0.0071 per pound) are significantly lower than the potential benefits of avoiding the 2006 E. 
coli O157:H7 outbreak and product recall. Since the implementation of the LGMA and its 
traceability system there has been several timely interventions and fewer recalls, mostly 
voluntary lower class recall.  This study makes its primary contribution to the goal of greater 
traceability by trying to show how the conditions that enable or impede traceability emerge from 
supply network structure.  The study also suggests that investments in rapid response, targeted 
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Table 1. Estimated Annual Industry Costs Relating to LGMA Compliance 
Food Safety Employee Wages      Range
   Average salary for food safety inspectors in 
the U.S.  $37,599
   Approximate number of dedicated food safety 
employees  267
   TOTAL ANNUAL FOOD SAFETY 
EMPLOYEE WAGES  $10,038,933
        
Irrigation Water Testing Expenses       
   Average cost for water testing (per test)  $42-$70
   Approximate number of annual water tests  73,956
   TOTAL ANNUAL WATER TESTING 
EXPENSES  $3,106,152-$5,176,920
        
       
   TOTAL ANNUAL LGMA MEMBERSHIP 
FUNDING  $4,500,000
        
Total Estimated Annual Operating Costs 
(LGMA Audit Compliance)  $17,645085-$19,715,853
Total Estimated Annual Investment Expenses  $62,092,780-$71,000,000
        
   Total Estimated Costs Relating to LGMA 
Membership  $79,737,865-$90,715,853
   Approximate annual volume of leafy greens in 
pounds (approx. 22-24 pounds per carton)  5,720,000,000-6,240,000,000
   Total Estimated Annual Costs (LGMA Audit 
Compliance) per lb  $0.0128-$0.0158
Total Estimated Annual Costs attributed to 
traceability per lb (20-45%)  $0.00256-$0.00711
Source: Compiled from Tootelian (2008), USDA (2009), Cline (2007), and Collards and Kale 












Table 2. Annual Costs Relating to Implementing a Traceability System, by Technology and Size 
Type of Cost/Variables      Estimated cost  Comments 
RFID System Components and Costs       
   Passive Tag Average Cost  $0.16 per tag  Firms choose either Passive or Active  
   Active Tag Average Cost  $5.00 per tag 
 
Average range $0.095 - $0.255 based on 1m tags 
   RFID Label Average Cost  $0.175 per label 
   UHF Handheld Readers Average Cost  $800.00 per reader  Stationary readers average cost $900 
   Employee Training  $85.60 per employee  Training ranges between 6 and 10 hours per employee 
(Average of 8 hours) at $10.70 per hour 
Fixed Costs 
   RFID Strategy and Application  $170,000  50 - 200 person days of labor (100,000 - 240,000) 
   Third-party Service Provider Fee  $75,000  EPCglobal ($75,000 for annual sales $1B to $10B) 
   Employee RFID Certification Course  $1,249  RFID600: CompTIA RFID + Certification Course 
   Middleware License Average Cost  $400,000  One time investment in Middleware 
   Edge Servers Average Cost  $10,400  List price is $5,200/server (IBM rec two for RFID) 
   Information System Operating Costs  $210,000  Average of $17,500 monthly system maint. & mgt 
   RFID Maintenance and Consulting Costs  $70,000  15% to 20% of acquisition cost (middleware lic) 
   RFID System Integration Average Cost  $50,000  One time cost for system integration 
Total Fixed Cost Depreciated Over 5 Years  $21,168,106 
Total Variable Costs (Passive Tag)     Total Costs (Passive Tag): Fixed + Variable 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 1)  $132,905 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 2)  $518,006 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 3)  $87,450,419 
Total Variable Costs (Active Tag)     Total Costs (Active Tag): Fixed + Variable 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 1)  $536,238 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 2)  $4,853,840 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 3)  $1,345,652,954 
Barcode System Components and Costs       
Variable Costs 
   Barcode Label Average Cost  $0.005 per label  Can be as inexpensive as 0.005 (print your own) 
   Barcode Label Printer Average Cost  $850 per label printer  Zebra printers average between $400 - $1,500 in 09 
   Barcode Handheld Readers Average Cost  $400 per reader  Stationary readers average cost $700 
   Employee Training  $10.70 per hour  Estimate 1 hour of training per employee 
Fixed Costs 
   Strategy and Integration Costs  $5,600.00  Software develop and integration 2,800 respectively 
   Barcode Software Average Cost  $90.00  Reviewing products for sale 
   Barcode Software License Average Cost  $5,000  xPOSe Site License 
   Software Support/Hosting/Maintenance  $1,500  xPOSe Annual Maintenance fee per site 
   General Barcode Hardware Average Cost  $2,750   Ranges between $2,000 and $3,500 
   Barcode System Integration Average Cost  $50,000  Ranges between $40,000 and $60,000 26 
 
Total Fixed Cost Depreciated Over 5 years  $1,393,258 
Total Variable Costs     Total Costs: Fixed + Variable 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 1)  $91,405 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 2)  $192,281 
   Total Variable Cost (Members 3)  $1,585,133 
Shipment Volume Category (Pounds)  Number of Members  Total Cartons 
0 to 100,000 (Member 1)  40  83,333 
100,001 to 999,999 (Member 2)  43  895,833 
More than 1 million (Member 3)  35  259,959,201  
Standard Carton of Packed Leafy Greens  24-count   (Approximately) 24 pounds/carton 
Leafy Greens Volume/Acre   29,000 lbs per acre  Range 13,000 to 45,000 pounds per acre (average) 
Number of total Cartons (AZ) - 15% of LGMA  52,000,000 
Number of Total Cartons (CA) - 75% LGMA  260,938,368 
Total Volume of L.G. in CA  6,240,000,000    
Average Number Acres per Employee  62  farm example: 3000 acres with 49 employees 
(Approx.) Total CA Leafy Greens Employees  4,540 
Variable Costs Individual Calculations       
Passive Tag Cost  $41,750,138.89  Based on number of cartons (one tag per carton) 
Active Tag Cost  $1,304,691,840.28 
 
 
RFID Tag Cost  $45,664,214.41 
 
 
Barcode Label Cost  $1,304,691.84 
 
 
UHF Handheld Readers ($800 per reader) 
 
 
   0 to 100,000  (3 readers)  $2,400 
 
 
   100,001 to 999,999 (6 readers)  $4,800 
 
 
   More than 1 million (12 readers)  $9,600 
 
 
Barcode Label Printer ($850 per printer) 
 
 
   0 to 100,000  (1 printer)  $850 
   100,001 to 999,999 (2 printers)  $1,700 
   More than 1 million (4 printers)  $2,550 
Barcode Handheld Reader ($400 per reader) 
   0 to 100,000  (3 readers)  $1,200 
   100,001 to 999,999 (6 readers)  $2,400 
   More than 1 million (12 readers)  $4,800 
Employee Training ($10.70/hr/employee) 
   0 to 100,000  (840 employees)  $8,988 
   100,001 to 999,999 (1,075 employees)  $11,502 
   More than 1 million (2,625 employees)  $28,087    27 
 
Table 3. Estimated Failure Costs Linked to the 2006 E. coli O157:H7 Outbreak and Recall 
Recall Related Costs      
   Retail value of Dole Baby Spinach (per unit of 3 lbs)  $3.89
   Approximate number of units recalled    42,000
   TOTAL RECALL RELATED COSTS    $163,380
Lost Productivity Expenses      
   Lost productivity due to E. coli O157:H7 (per case)  $1,871.96
   Approximate number of E. coli O157:H7 cases linked to 
outbreak  204
   TOTAL LOST PRODUCTIVITY EXPENSES  $381,879.84
       
Medical and Loss of Life Calculations    
   Did not visit physician and survived (per case)  $28
   Estimated unreported cases      6,000
      TOTAL      $168,000
   Visited physician and survived (per case)    $495
   Approximate number of cases    100
      TOTAL      $49,500
   Did not have HUS and survived (per case)    $6,550
   Approximate number of cases    70
      TOTAL      $458,500
   Had HUS and survived (per case)    $36,525
   Approximate number of cases    31
      TOTAL      $1,132,275
   Had HUS and did not survive (per case)    $6,766,498
   Approximate number of cases    3
      TOTAL      $20,299,494
   TOTAL MEDICAL AND LOSS OF LIFE COST  $22,107,769
       
Industry Lost Sales Following Outbreak and Recall  $80,000,000
       
Federal Funding (within Iraq Bill) to Compensate 
"Innocent" Farmers  $25,000,000
       
USDA Grant Funding to Identify Source of Outbreak  $1,200,000
Total Estimated Failure Costs (2006 E. coli Outbreak)  $128,853,028.84
   Approximate vol. of contaminated product (pounds)  15,750

























Figure 1 Supply Network Complexity/Coupling and Ease of Traceability 




























 Figure 2. Leafy Greens Supply Network 
 
 
 